

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**FORMING STANDING JOINT SPECIAL  
OPERATIONS TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS**

by

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## ABSTRACT

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Special Operations Forces (SOF) within a Joint Task Force are controlled by a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). Presently, JSOTF headquarters are formed around the core of the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), a service SOF headquarters, such as a Special Forces Group, or from a composite staff. These methods have significant shortcomings; the TSOCs ability to support SOF throughout the theater is reduced, a Special Forces Group is not trained or staffed to run a JSOTF at the component command level, and a composite staff element requires a substantial amount of time to operate effectively. This paper suggests an alternative way of providing a JSOTF headquarters that avoids these pitfalls. The recommendation is to establish a standing JSOTF headquarters within each TSOC. Included is an analysis of the major benefits and drawbacks of the proposal, an examination of alternative and interim solutions, and a proposed organizational structure for a standing JSOTF headquarters.

Forming standing JSOTF headquarters is a controversial issue. No unit or service is anxious to give up personnel to support an organization whose role is invisible to most except during a crisis. Some will contend that there is no real problem. JSOTFs formed in the past were ad hoc and they managed to get the job done. Our country, though, has now been attacked on its own shores and as a consequence, the nation is fully engaged in a global war on terrorism. Winning this war is our military's top priority, but to win it, we must be agile and global in depth. Standing JSOTF headquarters would give SOF an almost immediate command and control capability that is effective at the earliest moments of a crisis. They could provide this capability without detracting from the TSOCs ability to support other, perhaps simultaneous SOF operations in the theater. SOF will lead the military's war on terrorism. U.S. Special Operations Command and the TSOCs will orchestrate how SOF fights that war. Standing JSOTF headquarters would be an important tool that help the TSOCs command and control the fight.



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## FORMING STANDING JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

When the Joint Force Commander (JFC) forms a Joint Task Force (JTF), or similar headquarters to conduct military operations, he normally tasks the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) commander to establish an organization to command and control all Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the JTF. The result is a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). JSOTFs are ad-hoc organizations made up of a collection of joint SOF units formed specifically to support the JTF mission.<sup>1</sup> No two JSOTFs are exactly alike. The JSOTF headquarters, like the rest of the organization, does not exist until formed by the SOF commander. By doctrine, the TSOC should be prepared to (and often does) form the core staff of the JSOTF.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, TSOCs, as shown later in this paper, are not resourced adequately to serve as a JSOTF headquarters without augmentation. In addition, functioning as a JSOTF headquarters reduces the TSOCs ability to support SOF operations outside the scope of the JTF. Tasking other organizations to be the JSOTF headquarters-such as a Special Forces Group or a composite staff-has significant drawbacks. A Special Forces Group is not trained or manned to operate as a headquarters at the sub-unified command level, and composite staffs require substantial time working together to be highly effective.

This paper looks at an alternative way of providing a JSOTF headquarters to cause minimal disruption of the TSOC staff, even during times of crisis, and avoid the pitfalls inherent in composite staffs and under-resourced subordinate headquarters. The recommendation is to establish a standing JSOTF headquarters within each TSOC. Discussed in detail is an analysis of the major benefits and drawbacks of the proposal, a look at some alternative and interim solutions, and suggestions for an organizational structure for a standing JSOTF headquarters.

The first point of discussion is the fundamental question of how a standing JSOTF headquarters would improve SOF command and control and why it is preferable to the current method of organizing a JSOTF headquarters. The next section examines which headquarters a standing JSOTF headquarters should fall under, concluding with the recommendation that it should be imbedded within the TSOC. Also included in this chapter is information on Special Operations Detachments (SODs), a new program designed to provide temporary augmentation for the TSOCs with National Guard personnel. Following this is a recommended structure for a standing JSOTF headquarters and includes a description of each staff directorate and the senior staff positions. Included throughout this chapter is the functional relationship between

the standing JSOTF headquarters and the TSOC staff. The final section presents a summary and some concluding thoughts.

Before continuing, it is important to understand at what command level a standing JSOTF headquarters is designed to operate. As mentioned earlier, the senior SOF commander, also known as the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) establishes a JSOTF as a sub-unified component command to control all SOF under a unified command, such as a JTF.<sup>3</sup> This is the appropriate level to utilize a standing JSOTF headquarters. JSOTFs, however, can be established at various levels of command and vary greatly in size and complexity of mission. For example, Special Operations Command – Central (SOCCENT) currently supports two JSOTFs: JSOTF-Afghanistan, with a headquarters element numbering well over one hundred personnel, and a JSOTF headquarters in Djibouti with less than 50.<sup>4</sup> SOCCENT presently does not serve as a JSOTF but has delegated that to subordinate elements. If standing JSOTF headquarters existed today, SOCCENT might utilize it to run JSOTF-Afghanistan; conversely, a standing JSOTF headquarters would be an unnecessary use of limited resources in Djibouti. To reiterate, a standing JSOTF headquarters, as it is discussed in this paper, is designed to serve as the staff core of a JSOTF at the sub-unified, component command level.

#### **STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS JUSTIFICATION**

JSOTF headquarters can be formed in a number of ways. The most common is to use the TSOC staff as the core with the remaining positions filled by augmentees. Another method is to form the headquarters out of a totally composite staff. Additionally, the core of the JSOTF headquarters can come from a SOF service unit, such as a Special Forces Group or Naval Special Warfare Group. In all cases, substantial augmentation is necessary to round out the JSOTF headquarters. A standing JSOTF headquarters reduces the shortcomings of these methods and improves SOF command and control during a crisis.

The TSOC staff faces several challenges when it forms the core of a JSOTF headquarters. As the JSOTF nucleus, it must rapidly integrate a large number of augmentees from a variety of sources and meld them into a highly effective organization. Simultaneously, the TSOC must continue to support SOF throughout the theater. This is exceptionally difficult when most of the TSOC staff is fully engaged in support of JSOTF operations.

The augmentees that migrate to a JSOTF headquarters are not only large in number but often come from a variety of units with varying degrees of SOF experience. A JSOTF headquarters may contain hundreds of personnel with the TSOC providing less than half of the

manpower. Augmentation can come from a host of organizations including United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Special Forces Groups, Naval Special Warfare Groups, the Reserve and National Guard. Support might also come from conventional units as many JSOTF positions do not require SOF specific skills, such as personnel, logistics, and communications. The TSOC staff, then, must transform this composite force into an effective command element that controls and supports all SOF in the JTF. Simultaneously, the TSOC is still responsible for all additional SOF support throughout the theater, including SOF planning for the combatant commander. The difficulty of meeting these requirements is noted in Joint Pub 3-05.1 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations): when a JSOTF is

established using the nucleus of a theater SOC staff, it does not negate the Commander, [Theater] Special Operations Command's responsibility for continued parallel planning that may affect other missions or operations ongoing in the SOC's parent theater. The establishment of the JSOTF may impact on the SOC's other missions by the loss of key SOC staff personnel to the JSOTF.<sup>5</sup>

Developing a largely composite JSOTF headquarters formed around the TSOC into an effective organization is clearly a challenge. Even more difficult is the case when the entire JSOTF headquarters is a composite element.

During operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, the JSOTF headquarters was essentially a composite element.<sup>6</sup> In this type of situation, the staff must quickly learn to work together. They also must develop their relationship with the JSOTF commander, an individual they probably have never worked with before. They need to understand his way of doing business and how he thinks so they can immediately grasp his operational intent. This process is unavoidable and takes up valuable time. Unfortunately, during a rapidly emerging crisis, this developmental period often coincides with the start of combat operations, and what is possibly the most chaotic and intense phase of a campaign.

Special Forces Groups (SFG) are neither manned nor trained to serve as the headquarters at the sub-unified command level. There is, however, a precedent for SFGs to serve as the JSOTF headquarters. Examples are found as recently as operation ENDURING FREEDOM when the 5<sup>th</sup> SFG ran JSOTF-North beginning in October, 2001. They handed the mission over to the 3d SFG in March 2002, who in-turn passed it to the 20<sup>th</sup> SFG (National Guard) in the summer of 2002.<sup>7</sup> By the time the 20<sup>th</sup> Group took command of the JSOTF, the TSOC no-longer served as the SOF headquarters in the Joint Task Force and the SFG was

responsible for all SOF support. Throughout the entire period that the SFGs served as the JSOTF headquarters, they also supported their operational detachments engaged in combat. From available reports, the Groups performed well in their role as JSOTF headquarters. This is a result of outstanding personnel working tirelessly to get the job done, though by the time the TSOC departed, the theater was relatively mature, which contributed significantly to their success. Serving as the JSOTF headquarters at the outset of major operations, on the scale of those anticipated in Iraq, while also supporting their detachments, is a role that a Special Forces Group is not doctrinally expected to fill. A Special Forces Group is an Army organization, staffed to support the employment of its three tactical battalions. It is not a joint headquarters, and few, if any of the staff have served in joint assignments. The most senior members of a Group staff are majors while lieutenant colonels serve as the Group Deputy Commander and Executive Officer.<sup>8</sup> As a JSOTF headquarters, the staff coordinates directly with the Joint Task Force, fellow component commands, and, during coalition operations, foreign headquarters. A Group staff eventually learns through experience how to function well at the sub-unified and unified command level; however, it is a method that risks tactical effectiveness and soldier survival while the staff learns on the job. On the other hand, a standing JSOTF headquarters would have the experience and training to run a JSOTF, and allow the Special Forces Group to focus on operations at an appropriate level of command.

Whether the JSOTF headquarters is formed around the TSOC, a composite element, or a Group, it is difficult to mold it into a highly effective SOF headquarters. Referring again to Joint Pub 3-05, "the initial establishment of a JSOTF presents significant organizational, operational, and training challenges. These challenges affect the COMJSOTFs (JSOTF commander's) ability to rapidly fuse a diverse group of key personnel, with varying degrees of understanding and experience in joint Special Operations, into a functioning JSOTF."<sup>9</sup> A standing JSOTF headquarters, while not eliminating all problems associated with the current methods of forming a JSOTF headquarters, offers an alternative that reduces the friction inherent in composite organizations, allows the TSOC to focus on SOF operations throughout the theater, and places service SOF headquarters at the appropriate level of command.

A standing JSOTF headquarters would provide a cohesive nucleus that facilitates the integration of the composite elements into the JSOTF. It becomes the core of the JSOTF headquarters. The members of a standing JSOTF headquarters will work together constantly and be regionally focused. During peacetime exercises, they could function as a JSOTF headquarters. They would also develop the SOF campaign and contingency plans for the combatant commander. The members of the standing JSOTF headquarters would work with

the TSOC staff on a daily basis and know the TSOC commander well. They would use their training, experience, and knowledge of the commander to provide direction and guidance to JSOTF augmentees, and minimize the time necessary to form a JSOTF into a well functioning unit. In addition, a standing JSOTF headquarters will greatly reduce the current disruption caused when the TSOC forms the JSOTF headquarters.

In essence, a standing JSOTF headquarters will give the TSOC commander more options for SOF command and control. This increased ability to plan and support multiple, simultaneous operations is critical as the United States and its allies fight the global war on terrorism. For example, the situation currently exists where Theater Special Operations Command – Central (SOCCENT) continues to prosecute operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), support a JSOTF in the Horn of Africa, and prepare for possible combat operations in Iraq. When the TSOC forms the JSOTF, it cannot adequately support this level of SOF commitment.<sup>10</sup>

To further illustrate the level of command of a JSOTF, Figure 1 depicts a typical command structure under a Joint Force Commander (JFC) and shows the comprehensive role of a JSOTF within a unified command. The JFC might be the regional combatant commander or he could delegate that responsibility. The command structure could be a Joint Task Force or other unified command. In all cases, as Figure 1 illustrates, the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) commands the JSOTF and is responsible for command and control of all SOF under the JFC. Even when the combatant commander serves as the JFC, as General Franks did until May 2002 during OEF, the conflict rarely comprises all of the military activities taking place in the theater.<sup>11</sup> If current operations in SOCCENT are a vision of the future, multiple, simultaneous operations may become the norm.

The TSOC commander has little choice at present but to use composite elements or other SOF headquarters during multiple, simultaneous operations. A standing JSOTF headquarters, though, will increase the TSOC commander's options to command and control multiple operations. An example based on recent and potential activity in the South-West Asian Theater demonstrate how a standing JSOTF headquarters would provide the TSOC with more options for SOF command and control.

If a standing JSOTF headquarters had existed prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the Theater Special Operations Command – Central (SOCCENT) could have used it as the JSOTF headquarters during the critical initial phase of OEF in October 2001 when SOF were already conducting combat operations in Afghanistan. The TSOC, in turn, would have






FIGURE 1 – JOINT FORCE COMMAND ORGANIZATION<sup>12</sup>

focused on theater-wide SOF while the 5<sup>th</sup> SFG served as the Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF), a task they are well suited to perform. Jumping to events today; a war in Iraq appears imminent and SOF will certainly participate. With a standing JSOTF headquarters available, the TSOC commander would have several options for command and control of SOF; use the time available to form and train a composite JSOTF to support operations in Iraq, reorient the standing JSOTF headquarters to Iraq and backfill them in Afghanistan since the operational intensity in that area is diminished, or have the TSOC function as the JSOTF headquarters. The point of this example is not to come up with a solution but to demonstrate the increased flexibility the TSOC commander would have with a standing JSOTF headquarters. The advantages of a standing JSOTF headquarters may be readily apparent. The disadvantage of forming a JSOTF headquarters from a composite organization or the TSOC staff is noted even in U.S. joint doctrine. Why then, are there not already standing JSOTF headquarters? The remainder of this section discusses this issue.

Standing JSOTF headquarters do not exist because the benefit of having them has not been worth the cost; the cost in money, equipment, facilities, and most painful, in personnel. SOF is a high demand/low density (HD/LD) asset. There is not enough SOF to meet world-wide requirements. It makes little sense to establish standing JSOTF headquarters when the only way to fill the billets is to take personnel from already under strength SOF units. However, the situation appears to be changing, and it may be possible in the near future to field standing JSOTF headquarters without degrading the entire SOF force. In statements made in December, 2002, The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Donald Rumsfeld, noted the shortage of SOF along with the lead role that USSOCOM will play in the Department of Defense's (DOD) top mission, the war on terrorism.<sup>13</sup> The SECDEF proposed that USSOCOM grow by 4,000 personnel along with a budget increase of approximately \$5 billion over the next five years.<sup>14</sup>

Unfortunately, additional funding alone will not increase the number of SOF, and there is no indication that the cap on the number of military personnel will rise. This means that the 4,000 SOF spaces must come from existing DOD billets. Even with the available spaces, it takes time to recruit and train SOF personnel. It is a "SOF Truth," first penned by General (ret) Peter Schoomaker, former commander of USSOCOM, that "SOF are not mass produced."<sup>15</sup> Considering that it takes a minimum of 18 months to complete initial training for a Special Forces Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), and the difficulty of finding and recruiting the appropriate soldiers, it could easily be five years or more before the 4,000 personnel increase is realized in the field.

Despite these challenges, the substantial growth of SOF makes the concept of standing JSOTF headquarters feasible. The service members that would man the standing JSOTF headquarters are senior personnel. They must come from the existing SOF and conventional force. Most of the initial pain of fielding standing JSOTF headquarters would be felt at the various SOF headquarters since this is where the majority of the senior personnel necessary for a standing JSOTF are located. But this situation is only temporary, and as the force matures, personnel backfill those taken to form the standing JSOTF headquarters. This is an inevitable situation when forming a new organization requiring a core of experienced personnel. When the 3d SFG formed in 1990, the initial NCO cadre was drawn from the existing Special Forces Groups.<sup>16</sup> It was a painful experience at the time, but in the long run, it improved SOF capability. Fielding standing JSOTF headquarters will be similarly painful and take time. The benefit, though, of having highly effective SOF command and control at the sub-unified command level on day one of a conflict will be well worth the cost.

## **STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS LOCATION**

Standing JSOTF headquarters could exist at a variety of locations; imbedded within the TSOC, in a Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) headquarters, in the combatant commander's staff, or at U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The argument given earlier to justify forming standing JSOTF headquarters generally focused on the case when the standing JSOTF headquarters is imbedded in the TSOC. This section covers in more detail that course of action, but also looks at the advantages and disadvantages of the other options. Each has unique characteristics and warrants discussion.

### **THE STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS IMBEDDED IN THE TSOC**

Imbedding the standing JSOTF headquarters in the TSOC provides the most effective transition from the peacetime regional security and cooperation operations of a TSOC to its wartime role as the SOF component command. Doctrinally, the TSOC is expected to fulfill this role; however, the TSOCs are not adequately manned to do so without significant augmentation. Table 1 depicts each TSOCs authorized manning level in accordance with the Joint Manning Document.<sup>17</sup> It reflects the recommended manning levels as determined by a 1996 wartime requirements study conducted by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC). Based on this study, TSOC peacetime manning meets only 39 to 63 percent of their wartime requirement. Note that much of the TSOCs authorized manning is filled by the reserve. Other than Individual Military Augmentation (IMA) personnel already serving on active duty, a TSOC may wait 120 days or more from the time the component commander makes his initial request for reserve support to their arrival in theater.<sup>18</sup> Once activated, reservist's time on active duty is limited and dependent on the type of call-up.<sup>19</sup> Even during peacetime, some TSOCs require augmentation. Special Operations Command-South (SOCSO) has a continual augmentation force of approximately eight soldiers from the 7th SFG to support its peacetime regional security and cooperation program.<sup>20</sup> Clearly, current manning authorizations are insufficient to enable TSOCs to effectively serve as the JSOTF headquarters and adequately support theater-wide SOF requirements. A standing JSOTF headquarters imbedded in the TSOC will not make up the manpower shortage shown in Table 1. Used properly, though, it would be a force multiplier that assists the TSOC commander in peace and war.

During peacetime, a standing JSOTF headquarters could assume some of the tasks presently accomplished by the TSOC staff, enabling the TSOC staff to better support theater SOF. The standing JSOTF headquarters would take the lead in preparing the SOF portion of

TABLE 1 – TSOC WARTIME MANNING REQUIREMENTS<sup>21</sup>

Theater Special Operations Command Manning				
TSOC	Authorized Manpower Active/Res	1996 Wartime Req Study (ASD SO/LIC)	Manpower Shortage (war req-current auth)	Wartime Manning Percentage
SOC Korea	62/114	455	279	39%
SOC Pacific	107/110	431	214	50%
SOC Central	122/166	454	166	63%
SOC Europe	119/108	444	217	51%
SOC South	112/110	406	184	55%

of the combatant commander's campaign and contingency plans. This would free up the TSOC J-3 and J-5, while ensuring that the standing JSOTF headquarters staff thoroughly understood the plans they may have to execute. The standing JSOTF headquarters could also be the SOF headquarters for regional Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or combatant command exercises, including multinational events. Exercise CABANAS in Southern Command is an example where the standing JSOTF headquarters could function as a coalition or combined JSOTF.<sup>22</sup> Participation in the planning and execution of these exercises would be training opportunities for the standing JSOTF headquarters, and allow the TSOC staff to focus on other tasks. Serving as the JSOTF on a major exercise, the standing JSOTF headquarters would provide a dedicated staff whose effort was not diluted by the constantly emerging issues that face the TSOC staff and tend to push exercises down in priority of effort.

When imbedded in the TSOC, the standing JSOTF headquarters staff and the TSOC commander would know each other well and work effectively together. The commander would provide direct guidance and see the staff every day. This relationship is especially critical in the early days of a crisis when the operational picture is developing. It is during this period that the standing JSOTF headquarters would be most beneficial. When the TSOC commander assumes command of the JSOTF, he would be totally familiar with the JSOTF staff. The staff would also know the commander, and they would be completely focused on the JSOTF mission, with no distractions from other SOF operations in theater. Regionally oriented, and providing direct support to the TSOC commander during peace and war, no other location for the standing JSOTF headquarters affords all these benefits.

There is, however, a risk that the TSOC might over-task the standing JSOTF headquarters, or disperse the personnel among the existing TSOC staff sections. This may happen when an over-worked, undermanned TSOC assigns additional duties to the standing JSOTF headquarters. This could greatly help the TSOC support its daily requirements, but it

would also degrade the standing JSOTF headquarters' ability to plan, coordinate, and train to execute its primary mission of serving as a JSOTF headquarters. Equally harmful would be parceling out the standing JSOTF headquarters personnel to the TSOC staff sections. If this happens, the standing JSOTF headquarters could not train effectively. The standing JSOTF headquarters staff would become essential assets within the TSOC staff, and removing them to stand-up a JSOTF would cause the same level of disruption in the TSOC that it currently experiences when the JSOTF is activated. This situation is most likely to occur in commands that perceive a low probability of activating the JSOTF, and are willing to accept the risk to accomplish their day to day tasks. To mitigate these risks, USSOCOM must clearly define the mission of the standing JSOTF headquarters, while the TSOC commander assigns specific tasks and provides supervision.

#### THE STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS IN A STANDING JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS OR COMBATANT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

This section looks first at a standing JSOTF headquarters imbedded in a regional Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) headquarters. Later, it examines the case of a standing JSOTF headquarters assigned to the combatant commander's staff. This analysis assumes that all or most regional combatant commands will have a SJTF headquarters. While this is not a forgone conclusion, it is stated as a "goal" in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).<sup>23</sup>

Placing the standing JSOTF headquarters in the SJTF headquarters provides the best continuity between these two staff elements, and could be very advantageous when the JTF and JSOTF are activated. The standing JSOTF headquarters, in this case, would be an integral part of the SJTF headquarters during peacetime and crisis. This relationship reduces stress and friction during crisis situations and aids in planning and interoperability. It would help ensure that SOF planning was completely nested in JTF planning. Since both the SJTF headquarters and the standing JSOTF headquarters would be focused on the same goal of JTF operational effectiveness during a crisis, there is little possibility that the standing JSOTF headquarters would be siphoned off or diverted to support other activities.

Of course many of the advantages of placing the standing JSOTF headquarters under the TSOC disappear with this course of action. Interface with the TSOC staff and commander will be less when the standing JSOTF headquarters is assigned to the SJTF headquarters. Staffing of SOF plans would be more complex. Undoubtedly, the TSOC commander will continue to be responsible for theater SOF planning, just as he is now.<sup>24</sup> If the standing JSOTF headquarters leads SOF campaign and contingency planning, their work will have to be routed through a cumbersome path traveling from the standing JSOTF headquarters to the TSOC, possibly back

again to the SJTF headquarters, and finally to the combatant command staff. Another issue is the standing JSOTF headquarters chain of command. If assigned to the SJTF headquarters, these personnel would be rated by the SJTF and combatant command chain. While not an impossible situation, it is undesirable since the standing JSOTF headquarters will directly support TSOC peacetime planning requirements, and during crisis, the JSOTF will fall under the operational control of the TSOC commander.

Placing the standing JSOTF headquarters in the combatant commander's staff is an option, particularly if no SJTF were assigned to the theater. This scenario has essentially the same advantages and disadvantages as assigning the standing JSOTF headquarters to a SJTF. Coordination, though, would be directly with the combatant commander's staff. This could cause significant problems for the TSOC commander when SOF plans reach the combatant commander without his knowledge or approval.

#### THE STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS WITHIN USSOCOM

Rather than locating standing JSOTF headquarters within regional headquarters, USSOCOM could maintain a pool to meet potential wartime requirements. This is the most efficient course of action since it requires one less standing JSOTF headquarters. To explain further, there are four regional combatant commands located outside the continental United States (OCONUS), with the potential of assigning a standing JSOTF headquarters in each. A pool of standing JSOTF headquarters at USSOCOM would have to be capable of meeting the number of simultaneous military operations stipulated by the Secretary of Defense and Department of Defense. This guidance is found in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the 2002 draft National Military Strategy (NMS). To summarize, it is to "swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts...and conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations."<sup>25</sup> While "limited number of smaller-scale contingency (SSC) operations" is undefined in number or size of operation, it is clear that USSOCOM must be prepared to support at least two overlapping major conflicts. A third standing JSOTF headquarters would provide the ability to support an additional SSC requiring a sub-unified SOF command.

A pool of three standing JSOTF headquarters would give USSOCOM a level of flexibility not found in any other course of action. Each standing JSOTF headquarters would be regionally oriented based on USSOCOM priorities, which USSOCOM can adjust at any time. USSOCOM could apply more than one standing JSOTF headquarters to a region. In situations

where USSOCOM is the supported command in the war on terrorism, the command could establish a Joint Task Force formed around the standing JSOTF headquarters to prosecute terrorist networks that cross combatant command regional boundaries.

While providing great flexibility and conserving resources, this course of action sacrifices the cohesion present with standing JSOTF headquarters assigned to the TSOCs. Standing JSOTF headquarters at USSOCOM, even when regionally aligned, will not have the same level of regional expertise as those at TSOCs. Regional priorities at USSOCOM may change. The standing JSOTF headquarters at the TSOCs will always focus on their region and have a complete understanding of the SOF campaign and contingency plans. This depth of knowledge of regional SOF plans and geographic and cultural issues might be critical, especially at the outset of a crisis.

#### LOCATION OF THE STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS: CONCLUSION

Imbedding the standing JSOTF headquarters in the TSOC would give the TSOC commander a great tool during peacetime and crisis. The standing JSOTF headquarters would conduct SOF contingency and campaign planning, and plan and run major joint exercises; both of which allow the TSOC staff to better focus on SOF security and cooperation operations. A known quantity to the TSOC commander and staff, it would serve effectively as the core of a JSOTF headquarters from the very beginning of a crisis. Finally, USSOCOM will still retain the option to move a standing JSOTF headquarters from one theater to support operations in another. The TSOC, though, must resist the temptation to over-task the standing JSOTF headquarters or disperse its personnel into the TSOC staff. If that happens, much of the benefit of a standing JSOTF headquarters would be lost.

#### AN INTERIM SOLUTION

##### NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL OPERATIONS DETACHMENTS

USSOCOM has a program in place that provides augmentation to the TSOCs. The personnel come from the Army National Guard, with an Air Guard component to be added in the near future, and are formed into elements called Special Operations Detachments (SOD).<sup>26</sup> Concept development for this plan began in 1997 and received Department of the Army approval in March 2002. Each SOD presently consists of 30 personnel and Table 2 depicts the specific breakdown of Army National Guard personnel by position. SOD members come from both Active Guard Reserve (AGR) and reserve "Traditional Guard" who are activated upon call-up. Depending on the type of call-up, personnel can remain on active duty for up to two years in the case of Partial Mobilization, or for Full Mobilization, where they serve for the duration of the

emergency plus six-months.<sup>27</sup> There are six SODs, each affiliated with a TSOC. They are SOD-C (Central), SOD-E (Europe), SOD-J (Joint), SOD-S (South), SOD-P (Pacific), and SOD-K (Korea). Four SODs have already been mobilized with SOD-C and SOD-S to Central Command, SOD-J to the 5th Special Forces Group, and SOD-E to the 10th Special Forces Group.<sup>28</sup>

SOD UNIT MANNING					
POSITION	GRADE	MOS	POSITION	GRADE	MOS
COMMANDER	O6	18A	LOGISTICS OFF	O4	90A
OPERATIONS OFF	O5	18A	SUPPLY SGT	E7	92Y
OPERATIONS OFF	O5	18A	SUPPLY SGT	E6	92Y
OPERATIONS OFF	O4	18A	PERSONNEL OFF	O4	43A
OPERATIONS OFF	O4	18A	PERSONNEL SGT	E7	75H
OPERATIONS OFF	O4	18A	PERS ADMIN SGT	E6	75H
OPERATIONS OFF	O4	18A	INTEL OFF	O4	35D
CSM	E9	18Z	SIGINT OFF	O4	35G
OPERATIONS SGT	E8	18Z	SR INTEL ANALYST	E7	96B
OPERATIONS SGT	E8	18Z	SR SIGINT ANALYST	E7	98C
OPERATIONS SGT	E8	18Z	INTEL ANALYST	E6	96B
OPERATIONS SGT	E7	18B	SIGINT ANALYST	E6	98C
OPERATIONS SGT	E7	18B	CE OPS OFF	O4	25A
SF INTEL NCO	E7	18F	COMMO NCO	E7	74B
			COMMO NCO	E7	74B
			SR PARA LEGAL	E7	27D
TOTAL PERSONNEL(SF)		14	TOTAL PERSONNEL (non-SF)		16

TABLE 2 – SOD MANNING<sup>29</sup>

Each SOD is designed to work as a functioning staff unit with operations, intelligence, logistics, signal, and personnel sections. The SODs are regionally oriented, allowing the staff to improve their foreign language skills, better understand the cultural and geographic nuances of the region, and study theater military plans. A SOD is commanded by a National Guard Special Forces (18A) O-6. Unlike a standing JSOTF headquarters that exists at all times, a SOD is mobilized to support a specific crisis. When not mobilized, SODs train together as a staff during their weekend drill and annual training event. Additionally, SOD personnel may train with the TSOCs during extended OCONUS theater exercises. Once mobilized, the TSOC commander can task organize the SOD as necessary.

A SOD does not provide the same benefits as a standing JSOTF headquarters, but it does give the TSOC commander more flexibility. Because the SOD is not permanently assigned to the TSOC, it cannot provide the peacetime planning capability available with a standing JSOTF headquarters. Though SODs are regionally oriented, they may support any theater, as demonstrated by the deployment of Southern Command's SOD to support Central



Command. SODs do, however, give the TSOC commander a staff element that can serve as the core of a JSOTF, augment existing JSOTF staff, or backfill deployed TSOC personnel.

SODs do not take the place of standing JSOTF headquarters, but they are available now. Standing JSOTF headquarters have numerous hurdles to overcome before they will be fielded. While the Secretary of Defense has ordered aides to redesign USSOCOM from a “blank sheet” to better fight the war on terrorism, resolving standing JSOTF headquarters personnel and budget issues may take several years, even if the concept of standing JSOTF headquarters is approved.<sup>30</sup> Adding personnel to the TSOC Joint Manning Document could be a two year process. Standing JSOTF headquarters are not in the current USSOCOM budget and it could be two years or more before they are incorporated into the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and receive funding.<sup>31</sup> Until then, SODs provide a trained staff to the TSOCs and will continue to be valuable assets even when standing JSOTF headquarters are in place.

### **ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF A STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS**

The purpose of a standing JSOTF headquarters is to serve as the nucleus of the JSOTF staff. It will not, however, make up the entire JSOTF staff. Past JSOTF headquarters at the sub-unified component command level have reached well over 150 personnel. It is not practical or essential to have standing JSOTF headquarters of this size at each TSOC. Providing the number of qualified personnel necessary to maintain this capability at each TSOC would drain SOF to a debilitating point. Other resource issues, such as work facilities, equipment and family housing also make fielding 150-person standing JSOTF headquarters difficult. The achievable solution is to field the minimum number of personnel necessary to do the job. This number lies somewhere between the ideal of having a standing, fully staffed JSOTF headquarters that requires no augmentation, and a handful of staff officers that offer little advantage over the current method of fielding JSOTF headquarters.

This section examines a recommended organizational structure for a standing JSOTF headquarters, and looks at the requirements for each staff directorate. Figure 2 is a diagram extracted from Joint Pub 3-05.1 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations) which illustrates a notional JSOTF staff organization (yellow added by author). The blocks in yellow represent the proposed composition of the standing JSOTF headquarters. The sections in gray are important, but would be filled when the JSOTF is activated.




FIGURE 2 – NOTIONAL JSOTF STAFF ORGANIZATION <sup>32</sup>

Each staff section will consist of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO's) with the range of expertise and skills to examine all aspects of SOF planning. But before examining what the standing JSOTF headquarters could do, it is important to understand some of its limitations. As stated earlier, it would not compose the entire JSOTF staff. The leadership will exist within the organization to supervise twenty-four hour operations, but the standing JSOTF headquarters could not conduct twenty-four operations without augmentation. It will require support from the TSOC during peacetime and when operating as a JSOTF headquarters. During peacetime, the personnel of a standing JSOTF headquarters would need routine administrative support. In addition, products such as SOF campaign and contingency plans would still need to be reviewed by the TSOC staff and commander before they were forwarded to the combatant commander. When the JSOTF is activated, the TSOC, along with other organizations, will provide augmentation for some key staff positions. Though the amount is much less than TSOCs currently provide, some level of augmentation is unavoidable. The principle areas requiring augmentation are the sections marked in gray in Figure 2. With these limitations in mind, the next paragraph looks at the standing JSOTF headquarters organization in a broad manner.


A standing JSOTF headquarters is, by definition, a joint organization, and very rank heavy. Senior officers and NCO's will be critical to its success. The rank of the staff members should be commensurate with their duty requirements and level of responsibility. A JSOTF can

operate at any level, hence Figure 2 depicts no rank structure. A standing JSOTF headquarters, though, is designed to serve as a sub-unified component command. Senior personnel are necessary at this level for several reasons. First, the standing JSOTF headquarters is the core of the JSOTF staff. Augmentees will follow the guidance and direction provided by this core. It is important that the staff augmentation fall under the supervision of the standing JSOTF headquarters staff. A second consideration is the command level at which the JSOTF staff operates. They coordinate with their fellow component commands and the Joint Force Commander's staff. These are usually two-, three-, or four-star level staffs. In addition, JSOTF headquarters often coordinate with combined or coalition staffs of similar rank. Planning and coordination at this level requires experienced, joint officers. Senior personnel bring with them their experience and credibility to interact with their counterparts in the other commands. A third consideration is the role of the standing JSOTF headquarters in peacetime. As the TSOCs SOF campaign and contingency planner for the combatant commander, the standing JSOTF headquarters will conduct complex joint planning and interface with the combatant commander's staff and interagency personnel. The standing JSOTF headquarters staff, then, will be small in number but comprise senior officers and NCO's.

Figure 3 depicts the proposed manning for a standing JSOTF headquarters, with a total of twenty-three positions. Joint Pub 3-05.1 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations) describes the staff responsibilities of each section in a JSOTF.<sup>33</sup> The staff functions within a standing JSOTF headquarters will be similar. The remainder of this section discusses the specific requirements and capabilities of the standing JSOTF headquarters command, the staff directorates, and the key positions within each directorate.

#### STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS COMMANDER

An O-7 flag officer would command the standing JSOTF headquarters during peacetime. The TSOC commander may command the JSOTF when it is activated or he could delegate that responsibility to the standing JSOTF commander. In addition, this officer could serve as the TSOC Deputy Commanding General (DCG). The TSOC Deputy Commander is now an O-6 billet, which would be upgraded to O-7. The O-6 officer then becomes the TSOC Chief of Staff (CoS), a position which currently does not exist. The CoS would work for the DCG. These



### FIGURE 3 – PROPOSED STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION

changes offer significant advantages for the TSOC. The CoS would remain with the TSOC to supervise the staff when the DCG and TSOC commander moved to the JSOTF. The DCG, as an O-7, would supervise the O-6 and O-5 staff sections under his purview as standing JSOTF headquarters commander. Since the standing JSOTF headquarters will prepare SOF campaign and contingency plans, he would present these to the combatant commander. The TSOC commander would have much greater flexibility with an O-7 DCG. The TSOC commander may decide that he needs to focus on theater wide SOF issues; consequently, he could direct the DCG to command the JSOTF. If the TSOC commander chooses to command the JSOTF, he might have the DCG serve as the DCG for the JSOTF or have him supervise TSOC operations. In any of these situations, the JSOTF commander will be a flag officer and prepared to interface with his fellow component commanders, the combatant commander, and senior coalition officers. The DCG would be available to command a second JSOTF if another Joint Task Force were activated. In the case of two JSOTFs, the TSOC commander would likely choose to command the JSOTF in the theaters' main effort.

Ideally in a unit, the commander and his deputy are not the same rank. Changing the TSOC commander to a two-star position would resolve this problem. Considering the greater role of SOF in the war on terrorism and the corresponding importance of the TSOCs, a strong argument could be made that TSOC commands should be two-star positions. However, that discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. Units exist in which the commander and his

deputy are the same rank. The most obvious example, though not the only one, is the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Vice Chief, both four-star positions.<sup>34</sup>

The peacetime activities of the standing JSOTF headquarters would rarely demand a large part of the DCG's attention. The preponderance of his focus will be on his duties as the TSOC Deputy Commander. The standing JSOTF headquarters J-3, with assistance from his Senior Enlisted Advisor, would supervise the daily routine of the standing JSOTF headquarters personnel. The following sections address the individual directorates that form the standing JSOTF headquarters.

## J-2 INTELLIGENCE

The standing JSOTF headquarters J-2 will be an O-5, joint intelligence officer. His directorate becomes the intelligence core of the JSOTF. It collates and analyzes all-source intelligence to facilitate peacetime and crisis planning. The directorate would coordinate with the TSOC intelligence staff, higher military staffs, and national intelligence assets. Under the J-2 would be an O-4, all-source intelligence officer who, together with the J-2, coordinate with outside intelligence elements and supervise the three NCOs in the directorate. NCO capabilities would include a senior intelligence analyst, signals analyst (SIGINT), and imagery analyst (IMINT). The directorate must leverage TSOC J-2 capabilities for counter-intelligence support, intelligence staff support of standing JSOTF headquarters products, and administrative intelligence support. The Intelligence directorate will rely on support from the TSOC Special Security Officer (SSO) for clearance processing and use of the Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (TSCIF). The Intelligence directorate and the TSOC J-2 staff must not create a duplication of effort. To eliminate this possibility, requests for intelligence products from the Intelligence directorate should normally pass through the TSOC intelligence section.

## J-3 OPERATIONS

The Operations directorate will be headed by the J-3 Operations officer who supervises four subordinate cells. Three of the cells would be functional; ground, air, and maritime. The fourth is plans, though it would only be a small element that conducts J-5 planning for the standing JSOTF headquarters. It is placed under the control of the J-3 until the JSOTF is activated, at which time it would fall under the JSOTF J-5. This will give the standing JSOTF headquarters a modest J-5 capability without manning an entire J-5 directorate. The four cells enable the Operations directorate to conduct planning across the full spectrum of SOF capabilities, and during peacetime, develop the SOF portion of the combatant commander's

campaign and contingency plans. The Operations directorate integrates air, land, and maritime operations into a synchronized plan. It would also be responsible for Information Operations (IO) planning. During peacetime, the directorate must coordinate closely with the TSOC to complete staffing of standing JSOTF headquarters products.

The Operations directorate must rely on staff support from the TSOC in those areas not represented in the standing JSOTF headquarters staff. Fire support, psychological operations, civil affairs, and unconventional assisted recovery staffing will remain at the TSOC until the JSOTF is activated. The plans cell in the directorate, with assistance from the TSOC J-5, would work issues such as the JSOTF time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) of its augmentation force and potential combat elements. In addition, it would run the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), and assist the J-3 with long-range planning. The plans cell, in concert with the TSOC Staff Judge Advocate, would develop contingency and campaign plan Rules of Engagement (ROE).

The J-3 will be an O-6 joint officer. Along with supervising the Operations directorate, he would be the standing JSOTF headquarters Chief of Staff. As such, he supervises the three O-5 staff heads of the other directorates and would be responsible for the day to day activities of the standing JSOTF headquarters. During crisis, the J-3 becomes the JSOTF Operations officer while the three functional cells serve as the core of their respective sections in the JSOTF.

Each functional cell would be headed by a senior joint officer experienced in that cell's specialty area. For example, a Special Forces officer supervises ground operations, an Air Force officer with special operations experience heads air operations, and a Navy SEAL serves as the maritime planner. The ground operations cell would synchronize the overall plan. They must consolidate the planning efforts of the other cells and directorates into one comprehensive product. For this reason, their cell will be slightly larger than the others in the Operations directorate. The NCOs in the Operations directorate, and in the other directorates as well, would assist by providing advice based on years of experience and supplying critical technical skills.

#### J-4 LOGISTICS

The standing JSOTF headquarters J-4 would be an O-5 joint officer. In peacetime, the directorate would develop the logistical portion of SOF campaign and contingency plans. It will coordinate with the TSOC and SOF service components to ensure there are no gaps in the logistical plan between SOF unique and service common support. During crisis, the directorate becomes the nucleus of the JSOTF logistics staff. The Logistics directorate will supervise the

development, packaging, sustainment, and accountability of standing JSOTF headquarters deployment packages. It will also develop, with assistance from the TSOC staff, administrative cost estimates, and manage the standing JSOTF headquarters budget. The Logistics directorate would coordinate through the TSOC J-4 for administrative logistical support.

#### **J-6 COMMUNICATIONS**

The standing JSOTF headquarters J-6 will be an O-5 joint officer. The Communications directorate would develop SOF campaign and contingency communications plans and form the core of the communications staff in the JSOTF. The directorate will develop the communications architecture for the JSOTF, to include automated information systems. It also will examine communications interoperability issues with U.S. conventional and multi-national forces. The directorate would work with the TSOC SSO to control cryptographic materials.

#### **SECTIONS NOT PRESENT IN THE STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS**

The sections listed below are all essential to the functioning of a JSOTF. However, their ability to operate at maximum effectiveness during the initial formation of a JSOTF would be less critical than the directorates already mentioned. The standing JSOTF headquarters would have to leverage the TSOC staff capabilities of the following sections for planning and administrative support. This approach reduces the number of personnel required for the standing JSOTF headquarters while maintaining the core capability of fielding a highly effective JSOTF headquarters at the outset of a crisis. When the JSOTF is activated, these sections must be filled from the TSOC, USSOCOM, the Reserve, National Guard, or active duty conventional units. It is worth noting at this point that many of the personnel in the following sections possess non-SOF specialties and would come from the conventional force.

#### **J-1 Manpower and Personnel**

Manpower planning requirements for the standing JSOTF headquarters would be minimal. The J-1 will assist the Operations directorate in reviewing, modifying or developing the TPFDD. The J-1 will also provide routine administrative support to the members of the standing JSOTF headquarters, including the submission of standard personnel reports and awards.

#### **J-5 Plans and Policy**

As mentioned earlier, the J-5 will assist the plans cell of the Operations directorate.

### **Commander's Special Staff**

The commander's special staff consists of the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), the Public Affairs Office (PAO), the Chaplain, and the Surgeon. While not present in the standing JSOTF headquarters, the special staff will provide input for SOF campaign and contingency planning. They also would provide routine support to the standing JSOTF personnel.

### **Headquarters Commandant**

This individual will remain in the TSOC until the JSOTF is activated. The Deputy Commanding General may, however, appoint one of the standing JSOTF headquarters members as interim commandant to monitor daily activities.

### **JSOTF Liaison Element**

This element is established when the JSOTF is activated.

### **Command Senior Enlisted Advisor (CSEA)**

The CSEA will remain with the TSOC CG. When the TSOC commander assumes command of the JSOTF, the CSEA will be there with him. Until then, the Operations SGM in the Operations directorate would serve as the senior enlisted advisor.

## **ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE CONCLUSIONS**

The standing JSOTF headquarters staff will plan and train together as a unit. Their effectiveness as the core of a JSOTF headquarters will be measured by their ability to work effectively as a team from the very beginning of a crisis and even before the JSOTF is activated. The TSOC should avoid dispersing the personnel of the standing JSOTF headquarters to the TSOC staff sections. If this happens, the standing JSOTF headquarters will cease to exist, and forming a JSOTF headquarters will remain nearly as painful for a TSOC as it is today.

The standing JSOTF headquarters architecture described in this section provides a minimal base that can expand into an effective JSOTF headquarters. The TSOC commander may choose to alter the task organization somewhat to better accomplish missions specific to his theater. The twenty-three positions, however, provide a template that USSOCOM can use to base requests for funding, personnel, equipment, and facility construction.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

JSOTFs will continue to be substantially ad hoc organizations. Even with the core staff of a standing JSOTF headquarters, the majority of the personnel in a fully operational JSOTF headquarters will be augmentees. Standing JSOTF headquarters, though, will possess the



experience and training to quickly form the JSOTF headquarters into a highly effective staff team that is prepared to coordinate with the Joint Force Commander's staff and the other component commands.

Currently, the TSOC staff, a service SOF headquarters, or a composite staff forms the core of the JSOTF headquarters. The TSOC staff does this at the expense of theater wide SOF support. Composite staffs take time to reach maximum effectiveness and subordinate headquarters, such as Special Forces Groups, are not staffed to operate at the component command level. A Special Forces Group is an Army unit better suited to serve as the Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF).

A standing JSOTF headquarters would give the TSOC commander more flexibility in his SOF command and control structure. Until standing JSOTF headquarters are fielded, TSOCs can get augmentation from National Guard Special Operations Detachments (SOD). Ideally deployed as a unit, they provide a trained, cohesive staff. SODs can work at any level from the TSOC to an ARSOTF. They do not offer all the benefits of a standing JSOTF headquarters, but they exist now and are an improvement over composite staffs.

The structure discussed in this paper is the minimum necessary to form an effective standing JSOTF headquarters. Ideally, each TSOC would have a fully manned standing JSOTF headquarters that required no augmentation when a crisis occurred. Unfortunately, such an organization would number one-hundred personnel or more, and is realistically not achievable. The standing JSOTF headquarters proposed here cannot exist without the support of the TSOC. In return for the staffing and administrative support that the TSOC provides, the standing JSOTF headquarters relieves the TSOC J-3 and J-5 of the bulk of SOF campaign and contingency planning chores. In addition, the standing JSOTF headquarters would take responsibility for planning and executing select joint exercises. The two staffs should have a symbiotic relationship, not one that creates redundant efforts, increased bureaucratic log jams, and raises questions of who is responsible for what.

This paper addressed in only a cursory manner the numerous resourcing issues involved in fielding a standing JSOTF headquarters. The most daunting is obtaining the spaces on the Joint Manning Document, and subsequently finding the people to fill the four standing JSOTF headquarters. Another task is providing the necessary work and housing facilities. For most TSOCs, this would require additional construction. Work place items, such as furniture, automation equipment, and secure communications would be needed. Each standing JSOTF headquarters will require a deployment package with the staffing tools necessary to stand up a JSOTF infrastructure. Communications equipment needed would include an internal Local Area

Network (LAN) for the JSOTF and secure communications with the various other headquarters in the JTF. The concept is not to pre-package everything that a JSOTF might need. Instead, many items must be procured locally and others brought in through supply channels. The deployment package would, however, enable the JSOTF to provide command and control soon after arrival at a forward location, such as an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB), or Forward Staging Base (FSB). Until the JSOTF deploys forward, it would rely on the communications infrastructure at the TSOC.

Another challenge is to train the standing JSOTF headquarters staff as quickly as possible once the element is formed. Until the staff have worked together and have developed into an experienced, cohesive team, they offer only marginally greater benefit than an ad hoc staff. The TSOC at Joint Forces Command has a SOF Joint Training Team (SOF JTT) specifically designed to train prospective commanders and staffs of JSOTFs.<sup>35</sup> Utilizing the SOF JTT soon after the standing JSOTF is fielded, followed immediately with a demanding exercise, would quickly develop the skills and teamwork essential to an effective JSOTF headquarters.

Forming standing JSOTF headquarters is a controversial issue. No unit or service is anxious to give up personnel to support an organization whose role is invisible to most except during a crisis. Some will contend that there is no real problem. JSOTFs formed in the past were ad hoc and they managed to get the job done. Our country, though, has now been attacked on its own shores and as a consequence, the nation is fully engaged in a global war on terrorism. Winning this war is our military's top priority, but to win it, we must be agile and global in depth. Standing JSOTF headquarters would give SOF an almost immediate command and control capability that would be effective at the earliest moments of an operation. They would provide this capability without detracting from the TSOC's ability to support other, perhaps simultaneous SOF operations in the theater. SOF will lead the military's war on terrorism. USSOCOM and the TSOCs will orchestrate how SOF fights that war. Standing JSOTF headquarters are an important tool that will help the TSOCs command and control the fight.

WORD COUNT = 8957

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> John P. Abizad, Joint Pub 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001) x.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., II-1.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> The author obtained the JSOTF headquarters numbers from the SOCCENT Web page using the daily situation report (SITREP) of 8 Dec 02 from JSOTF-CRE, and 12 Dec 02 from JSOTF-Afghanistan. The SOCCENT webpage is accessed through the SIPR net (SECRET) and the specific personnel numbers are classified SECRET. This is an approximation of the number of personnel in the headquarters element to demonstrate the large variance in size of JSOTF headquarters.

<sup>5</sup> Abizad, II-1 to II-2.

<sup>6</sup> R. Robert Bauman, T. John Fishel, and Walter E. Kretchik, A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998)

<sup>7</sup> SFC Anthony Rudeen, Operations Sergeant, 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group, telephone interview by author, 20 February 2003.

<sup>8</sup> This assessment is based on the authors personal experience as a Special Forces Group Executive Officer and Battalion Commander from July 1998 to June 2001.

<sup>9</sup> Dennis C. Blair, Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998), II-1.

<sup>10</sup> Blair, III-3. Joint Pub 3-05 (Doctrine for Joint Special Operations) states "A JSOTF is a temporary joint SOF headquarters established to control SOF of more than one Service in a specific theater of operations or to accomplish a specific mission."

<sup>11</sup> David R. Brooks, Case Study – The First Year: U.S. Army Forces Central Command during Operation Enduring Freedom (Draft) (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 1 November 2002) 41.

<sup>12</sup> Blair, III-4 & fig III-2.

<sup>13</sup> Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments: Legislative Priorities for Fiscal Year 2004" Washington, D.C., September 17, 2002. In this memorandum, the Secretary of Defense provides to the Service Secretaries "the most current version of the top ten priorities" for the next 6-12 months. Number one is "successfully pursue the global war on terrorism."

<sup>14</sup> Bradley Graham, "Revamp of Special Operations Planned," Washington Post, 8 January 2003, p. 10.

<sup>15</sup> Abizad, I-6.

<sup>16</sup> John Pike, "3<sup>rd</sup> Special Forces Group (Airborne)," Global Security.org, 31 December 2002; available from <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/3sfg.htm>>, accessed 17 February 2003.

<sup>17</sup> SOCJFCOM is not included because it is not a war fighting SOC.

<sup>18</sup> David S.C. Chu, "DoD Mobilization Symposium November 18-20, 2002"; available from <http://www.nrpdc.nola.navy.mil/Nrams/Topic19.ppt>; accessed 17 February 2003. This was a presentation given by the Honorable David S.C. Chu, co-sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the JCS J-4, and given to approximately 300 attendees, including 100 general officers. The primary topic of discussion was reducing the current mobilization time line.

<sup>19</sup> Active duty time frames for reservists vary greatly depending on the type of call-up. For example, in the case of a Partial Mobilization, reservists can serve no more than 24 consecutive months. Reservists can serve for the duration of the emergency, plus six months for Full Mobilization.

<sup>20</sup> Remarks are based on the author's personal experience as the 7<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group Executive Officer and 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion Commander from July 1998 to June 2001. Throughout that time 7<sup>th</sup> SFG provided SOCSO a continual augmentation force.

<sup>21</sup> David McCracken, "Special Operations Forces Realignment Study – Final Report (SECRET)," (MacDill AFB, FL: USSOCOM, June 11, 2002), 114. While the overall classification of this document is SECRET, information contained in this paper is extracted from UNCLASSIFIED portions of the study.

<sup>22</sup> CABANAS is a large-scale, multi-national SOUTHCOM exercise that focuses on training soldiers and units to conduct peacekeeping operations. A coalition headquarters of up to eight countries participates in the exercise.

<sup>23</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR). (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, September 30, 2001. QDR 2001), 33-34.

<sup>24</sup> Blair, III-2.

<sup>25</sup> Richard B. Meyers, National Military Strategy of the United States (DRAFT) (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 19 September 2002), 14.

<sup>26</sup> COL Joseph Dibartolomeo, interview by author, 22 November 2002. COL Dibartolomeo is the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations for United States Army Special Operations Command.

<sup>27</sup> "Reserve Component Call-up Procedure – A Primer," Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, (U.S. Army War College 2002). 12-13.

<sup>28</sup> USSOCOM staff is organized differently than other joint staffs. The Special Operations, Plans and Policy Center (SOOP) roughly corresponds to a combination of the J-3 and J-5. There are four other centers at USSOCOM; Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics (SOAL), Special Operations Requirements and Resources (SORR), Special Operations Intelligence and Information Operations (SOIO), and Special Operations Command Support (SOCS).

<sup>29</sup> Dibartolomeo.

<sup>30</sup> Rowan Scarborough, "Rumsfeld Gives 'Blank Sheet' to Update Special Operations" Washington Times, November 21, 2002. p. 15.

<sup>31</sup> The Program Objective Memorandum (POM) is a Department of Defense funding process. Items requiring funding are submitted through the POM for approval. It is a six-year process, though high-priority items can be added up to a year out from the year of execution. The commander can fund high priority items that were not funded under the POM, but it requires taking money from a previously funded item.

<sup>32</sup> JP 3-05.1, II-4.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. II-5 to II-22.

<sup>34</sup> The author served as unit Executive Officer in an organization in which the Commander, Deputy Commander, and Executive Officer were all O-6 positions. While somewhat unusual, this system worked well.

<sup>35</sup> Michael Findlay. "SOCJFCOM: Integrating SOF into Joint Task Forces," Special Warfare, Vol 13, No.2. (Spring 2000). COL Findlay provides a comprehensive article on the type of training that the SOF JTT provides.



## GLOSSARY

AFSOF	Air Force Special Operations Forces
AIS	Automated Information Systems
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
ARSOTF	Army Special Operations Task Force
ASD SO/LIC	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict
CE	Communications and Electronics
CENTCOM	Central Command
COA	Course of Action
COCOM	Combatant Commander
COMMO	Communications
COMSOC	Commander, Special Operations Command
COMSOCCENT	Commander, Special Operations Command – Central
CONUS	Continental United States (mainland U.S.)
CoS	Chief of Staff
CSEA	Command Senior Enlisted Advisor
CSM	Command Sergeants Major
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence
DCG	Deputy Commanding General
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
INTEL	Intelligence
IO	Information Operations
JCMOTF	Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JFSOC	Joint Force Special Operations Component
JFSOCC	Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander
JPOTF	Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
JSOACC	Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JTF	Joint Task Force
LAN	Local Area Network

MAR	Maritime
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
NAVSO	Navy Special Operations Forces
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NG	National Guard
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSWTG	Naval Special Warfare Task Group
NSWTU	Naval Special Warfare Task Unit
OCONUS	Outside Continental United States
OE	Operation Enduring Freedom
OFF	Officer
OPS	Operations
PAO	Public Affairs Office
PERS	Personnel
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RES	Reserve
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SEA	Senior Enlisted Advisor
SF	Special Forces
SFG(A)	Special Forces Group (Airborne)
SGM	Sergeants Major
SGT	Sergeant
SIGINT	Signal Intercept
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SJFSOC	Standing Joint Force Special Operations Component
SJSOTF	Standing Joint Special Operations Task Force
SJTF	Standing Joint Task Force
SOCCE	Special Operations Command and Control Element
SOCENT	Special Operations Command – Central
SOCSSO	Special Operations Command – South
SOD	Special Operations Detachment
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOF JTT	Special Operations Forces Joint Training Team
SOLE	Special Operations Liaison Element



SR	Senior
SSO	Special Security Officer
TPFDD	Time-Phased force Deployment Data
TSCIF	Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command



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